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Abstract
We prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium in a production economy with infinitely
many commodities and a measure space of agents whose preferences are price dependent.
We employ a saturated measure space for the set of agents and apply recent results for an
infinite dimensional separable Banach space such as Lyapunov’s convexity theorem and an
exact Fatou’s lemma to obtain the result.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium in a production
economy with infinitely many commodities and a measure space of agents whose preferences are
price dependent. In a seminal paper, Aumann [3] demonstrated the existence of a competitive
equilibrium for an exchange economy with a finite dimensional commodity space and a contin-
uum of agents modeled as an atomless finite measure space by utilizing Lyapunov’s convexity
theorem to dispense with convex preferences. Aumann’s model in [3] was generalized to allow
incomplete preferences by Schmeidler [35] and to include production by Hildenbrand [15].
As Shafer[36]1 and Balasko [5] pointed out, price dependent preferences have been tradition-
ally explained by consumers taking relative prices as an indication of quality. In addition, we
∗We thank two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions. This research was supported by
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†Department of Mathematical Sciences, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea. Email:
hyoseok.jang@snu.ac.kr
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see other applications of price dependent preferences in the literature: Shafer [36] showed the
possibility of relating price dependent preferences to non-transitive preferences and Balasko [6]
demonstrated the equivalence of a temporary financial equilibrium model with an Arrow-Debreu
economy where preferences are price dependent.
Greenberg et al. [12] first proved the existence of a competitive equilibrium in a large economy
with price dependent preferences and a finite number of commodities. In [12], the authors
considered a large production economy with non-convex preferences. They reformulated the
production economy as a three-person game and applied Debreu’s social equilibrium existence
theorem to obtain a Walrasian equilibrium. In their proof, they applied Lyapunov’s convexity
theorem and Fatou’s Lemma in several dimensions. In order to utilize Fatou’s lemma, Greenberg
et al. [12] assumed the compactness of the consumption sets, which differs from Aumann’s
original model. Liu [29] dealt with a coalition production economy based on Greenberg et al.
[12].
For infinite dimensional commodity spaces, Khan and Yannelis [27] considered a large ex-
change economy and showed the existence of a competitive equilibrium. In [27], the commodity
space is an ordered separable Banach space whose positive cone has a non-empty interior. Until
recently, Lyapunov’s convexity theorem and an exact Fatou’s lemma for an infinite dimensional
separable Banach space were not available. Therefore, the authors had to impose the assumption
of convex preferences. They relied on the weak compactness of feasible allocations to extract
a convergent subsequence of competitive equilibria for truncated subeconomies to obtain the
existence of a Walrasian equilibrium. Now that the necessary mathematical tools are at hand, it
is natural to ask as to whether equilibrium existence results for a large economy with an infinite
dimensional commodity space, non-convex preferences and price externalities are available. We
give a positive answer in this paper.
Saturated or super-atomless measure spaces have played an important role in recent mathe-
matical economics. Podczeck [33] and Sun and Yannelis [37] successfully proved the convexity of
Bochner integrals of an infinite dimensional separable Banach space valued correspondence on
a saturated measure space. Based on saturated measure spaces, Khan and Sagara [21] proved
Lyapunov’s convexity theorem for vector measures taking values in an infinite dimensional sep-
arable Banach space and Greinecker and Podczeck [13] also showed it. Khan and Sagara [22]
established an exact Fatou’s lemma for an infinite dimensional separable Banach space. Khan
et al. [25] proved an exact Fatou lemma for Gelfand integrals which was also established via
Young measures by Greinecker and Podczeck [14]. These results have already been applied to
general equilibrium theory in several papers; see Khan and Sagara [23, 24], Khan and Suzuki
[26] and Lee [28]. In [24], the authors emphasized the importance of saturated measures by
saying that “the significance of the saturation property lies in the fact that it is necessary and
sufficient for the weak/weak* compactness and the convexity of the Bochner/Gelfand integral
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of a multifunction as well as the Lyapunov convexity theorem in separable Banach spaces/their
dual spaces.”
In this paper, we consider a large production economy whose commodity space is that of Khan
and Yannelis [27] and whose agents have non-convex and price dependent preferences, similar
to Greenberg et al. [12]. We employ a saturated measure space of agents and hence, we can
utilize the convexity of a Bochner integral of a Banach space valued correspondence, Lyapunov’s
convexity theorem, and the exact Fatou’s lemma for an infinite dimensional Banach space. With
these new results, we are able to relax the convexity of preferences and production sets, and
apply Debreu’s social equilibrium existence theorem. Moreover, we can obtain a competitive
equilibrium as the limit of a sequence of competitive equilibria for truncated subeconomies. We
dispense with the uniform compactness assumption on the consumption sets and production
sets, which was used in [12] and in [29].
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 contains notations and definitions. We present
our model in Section 3, and our main and auxiliary results are in Section 4. The proof of the
auxiliary result is in Section 5 followed by the proof of the main theorem in Section 6. Section
7 concludes the paper with our remarks.
2 Notation and Definitions
Let X,Y be topological spaces. A set-valued function or a correspondence F from Y to the
family of non-empty subsets of Y is called upper semicontinuous if the set {x : X : F (x) ⊂ V }
is open in X and said to be lower semicontinuous if the set {x : X : F (x) ∩ V 6= ∅} is open
in X for every V of Y . When Y is a Banach space, F is norm upper semicontinuous if the set
{x : X : F (x) ⊂ V } is open in X for every norm open subset V of Y . And F is called weakly
upper semicontinuous if the set {x : X : F (x) ⊂ V } is open in X for every weakly open subset
V of Y . We say that F is norm lower semicontinuous if the set {x : X : F (x) ∩ V 6= ∅} is open
in X for every norm open subset V of Y and F is said to be weakly lower semicontinuous if the
set {x : X : F (x) ∩ V 6= ∅} is open in X for every weakly open subset V of Y .
Let (T,T , µ) be a finite measure space and E be a Banach space. A measurable function
f : (T,T , µ)→ E is said to be Bochner integrable if there exists a sequence of simple functions
{fn}n∈N such that
lim
n→∞
∫
T
‖fn(t)− f(t)‖ dµ = 0 (2.1)
where N denotes the set of natural numbers. For each S ∈ T the integral is defined to be∫
S
f(t)dµ = limn→∞
∫
S
fn(t)dµ. Denote by L
1(µ,E) the space of (the equivalence classes of)
E-valued Bochner integrable functions f : T → E normed by ‖f‖1 =
∫
T
‖f(t)‖ dµ.
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The weak upper limit of a sequence {Sn} of subsets in E is defined by
w-Ls Sn = {x ∈ E : ∃{xnk} such that x = w- limxnk , xnk ∈ Snk , for all k ∈ N} (2.2)
where {xnk} is a subsequence of a sequence {xn} and w- limn xnk denotes the weak limit point
of {xnk}.
A correspondence F : T → 2E is said to bemeasurable if for every open subset V of E, the set
{t ∈ T : F (t)∩V 6= ∅} ∈ T . The correspondence F is said to have a measurable graph if its graph
GF = {(t, x) ∈ T ×E : x ∈ F (t)} belongs to the product σ-algebra T ⊗B(E,w), where B(E,w)
denotes the Borel σ-algebra of E generated by the weak topology. If correspondences from T
to E are closed valued, measurability and graph measurability are equivalent when (T,T , µ) is
complete and E is separable.2 A measurable correspondence F : T → 2E is integrably bounded if
there exists a real-valued integrable function h on (T,T , µ) such that sup{‖x‖ : x ∈ F (t)} ≤ h(t)
for almost all t ∈ T .
A measurable function f from (T,T , µ) to E is called a measurable selection of the corre-
spondence F if f(t) ∈ F (t) for almost all t ∈ T . By Aumann’s measurable selection theorem in
[4], if (T,T , µ) is a complete finite measure space, F has a measurable graph, and E is separable,
then F has a measurable selection. We denote by S1F the set of all E-valued Bochner integrable
selections for the correspondence F , i.e., S1F = {f ∈ L
1(µ,E) : f(t) ∈ F (t) a.e. t ∈ T}. When
F is also integrably bounded, it admits a Bochner integrable selection so that S1F is non-empty.
The integral of the correspondence F is defined by
∫
T
F (t)dµ = {
∫
T
f(t)dµ : f ∈ S1F }. (2.3)
A sequence of correspondences {Fn} from T to E is said to be well-dominated if there
exists an integrably bounded and weakly compact-valued correspondence φ : T → 2E such that
Fn(t) ⊂ φ(t) a.e. t ∈ T for each n.
Let E be an ordered Banach space equipped with ordering ≥ such that the positive cone
E+ = {x ∈ E : x ≥ 0} of E is closed. For x, y ∈ E, x > y means x − y ∈ E+ and x 6= y. We
denote by E∗ the dual space of E, i.e., the space of all continuous linear functionals from E into
R. For x ∈ E, p ∈ E∗, we write p · x for the value of p at x. We denote by E∗+ the dual cone of
E+, i.e., E
∗
+ = {p ∈ E
∗ : p ·x ≥ 0 for all x ∈ E+}. We denote by B(E
∗, w∗) the Borel σ-algebra
of E∗ generated by the weak* topology. For any set A in E, clA stands for the norm closure of
A and coA for the convex hull of A.
Let (T,T , µ) be a finite measure space. Denote by L1(µ) the the space of (µ-equivalence
classes of) real valued integrable functions on T . Let TS = {A∩ S|A ∈ T } be the sub-σ-algebra
of T restricted to S ∈ T and µS be a restriction of µ to TS. We write L
1
S(µ) for the vector
2See Theorem 8.1.4 in [2].
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subspace of L1(µ) which consists of each function in L1(µ) restricted to S.
Definition 1. A finite measure space (T,T , µ) is saturated if L1S(µ) is non-separable for every
S ∈ T with µ(S) > 0.
A saturated measure space is also called “super-atomless” in Podczeck [33]. Other equivalent
definitions for saturation are available in the literature; see [10], [11], [17], [20], and [33]. As men-
tioned in Khan and Sagara [24], “a germinal notion of saturation already appeared in [19, 30],”
and Kakutani [19] constructed a non-separable extension of the Lebesgue measure space which
can be seen as a saturated extension of the Lebesgue interval.3 Examples of saturated measure
spaces include the product spaces of the form [0, 1]κ and {0, 1}κ, where κ is an uncountable car-
dinal, [0, 1] is endowed with the Lebesgue measure and {0, 1} the fair coin flipping measure. The
cardinalities of these two examples are greater than the continuum. Podczeck [33] constructed a
saturated measure structure on the unit interval by “enriching” the Lebesgue σ-algebra. Thus,
as is pointed out in [33], when we have a saturated measure space of agents, the cardinality of
the set of agents is not necessarily larger than the continuum.
3 The Model
The commodity space E is an ordered separable Banach Space with an interior point v in E+.
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For the space of agents, we employ a complete probability space (T,T , µ) which is saturated.
Let X be a correspondence from T to E+. The consumption set of agent t ∈ T is given by
X(t) ⊂ E+. The initial endowment of each agent is given by a Bochner integrable function
e : T → E where e(t) ∈ X(t) for all t ∈ T . The aggregate initial endowment is
∫
T
e(t)dµ. Let Y
be a correspondence from T to E. The production set of agent t is given by Y (t) ⊂ E. A price is
p ∈ E∗+\{0}. Let ∆ = {p ∈ E
∗
+\{0} : p·v = 1} be the price space. Then by Alaoglu’s theorem, ∆
is weak* compact. Let E = [(T,T , µ), (X(t), Y (t), Ut, e(t))t∈T ] be a production economy where
Ut : X(t) ×∆ → R represents agent t’s utility function. We also write U(t, x, p) = Ut(x, p) for
t ∈ T , x ∈ X(t) and p ∈ ∆. An allocation for E is a Bochner integrable function f : T → E+ such
that f ∈ S1X and a production plan is a Bochner integrable function g : T → E such that g ∈ S
1
Y .
The budget set of agent t at a price p ∈ ∆ is B(t, p) = {x ∈ X(t) : p ·x ≤ p · e(t)+max p ·Y (t)}.
A competitive equilibrium for E is a triple of a price p, an allocation f and a production
plan g such that
1. p · f(t) ≤ p · e(t) + p · g(t) for almost all t ∈ T ,
2.
∫
T
f(t)dµ ≤
∫
T
e(t)dµ +
∫
T
g(t)dµ,
3We are grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to Kakutani [19].
4The examples of this space include C(K), the set of bounded continuous functions on a Hausdorff compact
metric space K equipped with sup norm and a weakly compact subset of L∞(µ) where µ is a finite measure.
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3. for any x ∈ X(t), Ut(x, p) > Ut(f(t), p) implies that p · x > p · e(t) + p · g(t) for almost all
t ∈ T ,
4. p · g(t) = max p · Y (t) for almost all t ∈ T .
We assume that the production economy E satisfies the following assumptions:
A.1 X(t) is non-empty, closed, convex, integrably bounded and weakly compact for all t ∈ T .
A.2 Y (t) is non-empty, closed, integrably bounded and weakly compact for all t ∈ T .
A.3 There is an element η(t) ∈ X(t) such that e(t)− η(t) is in the norm interior of E+ for all
t ∈ T .
A.4 (i) Ut : X(t) × ∆ → R is a jointly continuous function on X(t) × ∆ for all t ∈ T where
X(t) is equipped with the weak topology and ∆ with the weak* topology. (ii) If x ∈ X(t)
is a satiation point for Ut(·, p), then x ≥ e(t) + y for any y ∈ Y (t); if x ∈ X(t) is not
a satiation point for Ut(·, p), then x belongs to the weak closure of the set {x
′ ∈ X(t) :
Ut(x
′, p) > Ut(x, p)} for every p ∈ ∆.
A.5 U is jointly measurable with respect to T ⊗ B(E,w) ⊗ B(E∗, w∗).
A.6 the correspondence X : T → 2E has a measurable graph, i.e., GX ∈ T ⊗ B(E,w).
A.7 the correspondence Y : T → 2E has a measurable graph, i.e., GY = {(t, y) ∈ T × E : y ∈
Y (t)} ∈ T ⊗ B(E,w).
A.8 0 ∈ Y (t) for all t ∈ T where 0 is the zero vector of E.
In A.1 and A.2, we assume that both the consumption sets and the production sets are
weakly compact. Although these assumptions seem strong, the weakly compact consumption
set assumption was employed in Khan and Yannelis [27], Podczeck [32] and Khan and Sagara
[24].5 With this assumption, Khan and Yannelis [27] made the set of feasible allocations weakly
compact, Podczeck [32] obtained a weakly compact-valued demand correspondence, and Khan
and Sagara [24] were able to invoke the exact Fatou’s lemma for an infinite dimensional separable
Banach space. We use the weak compactness assumption to apply the exact Fatou’s lemma for
our results. A.4 (ii) is imposed in [24, 28, 32] and the second part plays a similar role to the
“local nonsatiation” assumption.
5Since these three papers dealt with exchange economies, the production sets are irrelevant.
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4 Results
The following theorem is our main result:
Main Theorem. Suppose that the production economy E satisfies A.1-A.8. Then there exists
a competitive equilibrium for E.
The proof of the Main Theorem is provided in Section 6. As is well known, for x ∈ E and
p ∈ ∆ the bilinear map (p, x) 7→ p · x is not jointly continuous if E is equipped with the weak
topology and ∆ with the weak* topology. But when E is equipped with the norm topology, the
bilinear map is continuous.6 To utilize this property, we modify A.1 and A.2:
A.1′ X(t) is non-empty, closed, convex, integrably bounded and norm compact for all t ∈ T .
A.2′ Y (t) is non-empty, closed, integrably bounded and norm compact for all t ∈ T .
We now introduce the following auxiliary result:
Auxiliary Theorem. Suppose that the production economy E satisfies A.1′, A.2′ and A.3-A.8.
Then there exists a competitive equilibrium for E.
We provide the proof of the Auxiliary Theorem in Section 5. We follow the idea of [12] for
the proof of the Auxiliary Theorem. Greenberg et al. [12] applied Debreu’s [8] social equilibrium
result to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
We introduce a 3-person game Γ which consists of three sets K1,K2,K3, and three corre-
spondence A1 : K2 ×K3 → 2
K1 , A2 : K1 ×K3 → 2
K2 , A3 : K1 ×K2 → 2
K3 , and three functions
ui : K1×K2×K3 → R (i = 1, 2, 3). Let I = {1, 2, 3} and let K−i = Πj 6=iKj (i, j ∈ I). We write
ki for an element in Ki and k−i for K−i.
An equilibrium for Γ is k∗ ∈ K1 ×K2 ×K3 such that for all i ∈ I
k∗i ∈ argmax ki∈Ai(k∗−i)ui(ki, k
∗
−i). (4.1)
The following lemma is Debreu’s [8] social equilibrium theorem for a Banach space.
Lemma 1. Let Γ be a 3-person game and suppose Γ satisfies, for i ∈ I,
(i) Ki is a non-empty, convex, and compact subset of a Banach space;
(ii) Ai is continuous, non-empty, closed and convex valued;
(iii) ui is continuous and quasi-concave on Ki.
Then Γ has an equilibrium.
6See Aliprantis and Border [1] pp. 241-242.
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Proof. By applying a standard argument to our Banach space, we can have the result.
Based on Lemma 1, we will prove the Auxiliary Theorem. Toward this end, we specify our
Γ. Without loss of generality, we assume the values of Ut are contained in [0, 1] for all t ∈ T .
Let K1 = ∆, K2 =
∫
T
X(t)dµ× [0, 1], and K3 =
∫
T
Y (t)dµ. For p ∈ K1, (x, α) ∈ K2 and y ∈ K3,
let A1((x, α), y) = K1, A2(p, y) = {(x, α) ∈ K2 : ∃f ∈ S
1
X such that x =
∫
T
f(t)dµ, f(t) ∈
B(t, p) a.e t ∈ T, α =
∫
T
Ut(f(t), p)dµ}, A3(p, (x, α)) = K3, and
u1(p, (x, α), y) = p · (x−
∫
T
e(t)dµ − y), u2(p, (x, α), y) = α, u3(p, (x, α), y) = p · y. (4.2)
Lemma 2. Under A.1′ and A.2′,
∫
T
X(t)dµ and
∫
T
Y (t)dµ are norm compact and convex.
Proof. By appealing to Proposition 1 in Sun and Yannelis [37], we have the results.
Lemma 3. B(t, p) is a non-empty and continuous correspondence in p when X(t) and Y (t) are
norm compact and ∆ is weak* compact.
Proof. By A.8, it is clear that max p · Y (t) ≥ 0. Then η(t) ∈ B(t, p) for any p ∈ ∆. Therefore,
B(t, p) is non-empty.
Let ψt : ∆→ R be a function defined by ψt(p) = max y∈Y (t) p · y. By Berge’s theorem, ψt(p)
is continuous in p. We define a function zt : ∆→ R by
zt(p) = p · e(t) + max p · Y (t) = p · e(t) + ψt(p). (4.3)
Clearly, zt(p) is continuous in p. The budget correspondence can be rewritten as B(t, p) = {x ∈
X(t) : p · x ≤ zt(p)}. By A.3 and A.8, zt(p) > 0 for all p ∈ ∆. Then a standard argument can
be adopted to show that B(t, p) is continuous in p.
The following is the exact Fatou’s lemma for Banach spaces proved by Khan and Sagara
[22].
Lemma 4 (Theorem 3.5 in [22]). Let (T,T , µ) be a complete saturated finite measure space
and E be a Banach space. If {fn} is a well-dominated sequence in L
1(µ,E), then there exists
f ∈ L1(µ,E) such that
(i) f(t) ∈ w-Ls{fn(t)} a.e. t ∈ T ,
(ii)
∫
fdµ ∈ w-Ls{
∫
fndµ}.
Lemma 5. Under A.1′ and A.2′, Ai is continuous, non-empty, closed and convex valued for
i = 1, 2, 3.
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Proof. We adopt the idea of the proof from [12]. It is clear that K1 = ∆ is non-empty and
convex. By Alaoglu’s theorem, it is weak* compact and thus, weak* closed. It follows that A1
is non-empty, closed and convex valued. From A.8, 0 ∈
∫
T
Y (t)dµ and thus K3 =
∫
T
Y (t)dµ is
non-empty. By Lemma 2,
∫
T
Y (t)dµ is convex and norm compact and thus, norm closed. Hence,
A3 is non-empty, closed and convex valued. Clearly, A1 and A3 are continuous.
We now turn to A2. Since the initial endowment map e(t) ∈ B(t, p), A2 is non-empty. Note∫
T
e(t)dµ ∈
∫
T
X(t)dµ for all t ∈ T and
∫
T
Ut(e(t), p)dµ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, K2 =
∫
T
X(t)dµ× [0, 1] is
non-empty. By Lemma 2,
∫
T
X(t)dµ is norm compact and convex. It follows that K2 is compact
and convex.
We show the value of A2 is closed. We need to show (x, α) ∈ A2(p, y) when xn → x in norm
and αn → α such that (xn, αn) ∈ A2(p, y) for all n. Then there exists a sequence {fn} ⊂ S
1
X
such that xn =
∫
T
fn(t)dµ and αn =
∫
T
Ut(fn(t), p)dµ with fn(t) ∈ B(t, p) for all n. By virtue
of A.1′, {fn} is well-dominated. We can appeal to Lemma 4 to have f ∈ L
1(µ,E) such that
f(t) ∈ X(t), f(t) ∈ w-Ls{fn(t)} for a.e. t ∈ T, and
∫
T
f(t)dµ ∈ w-Ls{
∫
fndµ}. Thus we can
extract a subsequence from {fn} (which we do not relabel) such that fn(t)→ f(t) weakly for a.e.
t ∈ T and
∫
T
fn(t)dµ →
∫
T
f(t)dµ weakly. Since B(t, p) is norm compact and fn(t) ∈ B(t, p)
for all n, it follows f(t) ∈ B(t, p). The weak limit
∫
T
f(t)dµ of the subsequence of {xn} must
be equal to the norm limit x of the whole sequence {xn}. Because Ut(·, p) is weakly continuous,
Ut(fn(t), p)→ Ut(f(t), p) for a.e. t ∈ T . On the other hand, let gn(t) = Ut(fn(t), p). Then from
the boundedness of U , the sequence of functions {gn} is well-dominated. Lemma 4 implies that
there exists g ∈ L1(µ) such that gn(t) → g(t) for a.e. t ∈ T and αn =
∫
T
gn(t)dµ →
∫
T
g(t)dµ
up to subsequence. Hence g(t) = Ut(f(t), p) for a.e. t ∈ T and α = limn αn =
∫
T
g(t)dµ =∫
T
Ut(f(t), p)dµ.
Next, we show the upper semicontinuity of A2. Since K2 is compact, in order to prove A2
is upper semicontinuous, it is sufficient to show that the graph of A2 is closed. Let pn → p in
the weak* topology and yn → y in the norm topology. We want to show that (x, α) ∈ A2(p, y)
when xn → x in norm and αn → α with (xn, αn) ∈ A2(pn, yn) for all n. There exists {fn} such
that xn =
∫
T
fn(t)dµ and αn =
∫
T
Ut(fn(t), pn)dµ with fn(t) ∈ B(t, pn) for a.e t ∈ T for all n.
Clearly {fn} is well-dominated.
Let gn(t) = Ut(fn(t), pn) and φn(t) = (fn(t), gn(t)). Then it is clear that {gn} and {φn}
are both well-dominated. Consequently, there exists an integrable function φ on T such that
φ(t) ∈ w-Ls{φn(t)} a.e. t ∈ T and
∫
T
φdµ ∈ w-Ls{
∫
T
φndµ} by Lemma 4, where φ(t) =
(f(t), g(t)) for some f ∈ L1(µ,E) and g ∈ L1(µ) with f(t) ∈ X(t) and g(t) ∈ R. Then
we can extract a convergent subsequence {φn} (we do not relabel) such that φn(t) → φ(t)
weakly for a.e. t ∈ T and
∫
T
φn(t)dµ →
∫
T
φ(t)dµ weakly. So we have fn(t) → fn(t) weakly
for a.e. t ∈ T , gn(t) → g(t) weakly for a.e. t ∈ T ,
∫
T
fn(t)dµ →
∫
T
f(t)dµ weakly and
αn =
∫
T
gn(t)dµ→
∫
T
g(t)dµ.
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Because xn =
∫
T
fn(t)dµ converges to x in norm,
∫
T
f(t)dµ = x. By the joint continuity of
Ut, Ut(fn(t), pn) → Ut(f(t), p) for a.e. t ∈ T. Hence, we have g(t) = Ut(f(t), p) a.e. t ∈ T and∫
T
Ut(f(t), p)dµ =
∫
T
g(t)dµ = limn αn = α.
Now it remains to show f(t) ∈ B(t, p). Because X(t) is norm compact, fn(t) converges up to
subsequence to some limit in norm, which must be equal to f(t). It follows that for a.e. t ∈ T ,
pn · fn(t)→ p · f(t). Since pn · fn(t) ≤ pn · e(t) + max pn · Y (t), we have
p · f(t) ≤ p · e(t) + max p · Y (t). (4.4)
Therefore, f(t) ∈ B(t, p) for almost all t ∈ T . In sum, we showed that A2 is norm upper
semicontinuous.
We now prove the lower semicontinuity of A2. Suppose (x, α) ∈ A2(p, y). In order to show A2
is lower semicontinuous, it suffices to find a sequence (xn, αn) such that (xn, αn) ∈ A2(pn, yn)
converging to (x, α) in norm. Since (x, α) ∈ A2(p, y), there exists a function f such that
x =
∫
T
f(t)dµ and α =
∫
T
Ut(f(t), p). Notice that since for any p ∈ ∆, B(t, p) is a norm closed
subset of X(t), it is norm compact. Clearly it is convex.
Consider pn → p in the weak* topology and, yn → y in the norm topology. Note that
B(t, pn) is convex and norm compact. Thus one can choose fn(t) from B(t, pn) such that fn(t)
is the closest to f(t), i.e.,
‖fn(t)− f(t)‖ ≤ ‖z − f(t)‖ for all z ∈ B(t, pn). (4.5)
We will show that fn is measurable. Note that B(·, p) has a measurable graph. To see this,
we adopt [27]. For p ∈ ∆, define ξp : T ×E → [−∞,∞] by ξp(t, x) = p ·x−p ·e(t)−max p ·Y (t).
By Proposition 3 in [16] (p.60), max p · Y (t) is measurable in t. Then ξp is measurable in t and
continuous in x. By Proposition 3.1 in [39], ξp(·, ·) is jointly measurable. Notice that
GB(·,p) = {(t, x) ∈ T ×X(t) : p · x ≤ p · e(t) + max p · Y (t)} = ξ
−1
p ([−∞, 0]) ∩GX (4.6)
and thus the budget correspondence B(·, p) is graph measurable given p.
By Castaing’s Representation Theorem in [39], there exists {hnm(t) : m ∈ N} whose norm
closure is B(t, pn). Let
Ψnm(t) = {z ∈ B(t, pn) : ‖z − f(t)‖ ≤ ‖h
n
m(t)− f(t)‖} (4.7)
and
Ψn(t) ≡ ∩∞m=1Ψ
n
m(t). (4.8)
From the fact that B(t, p) is norm compact and the continuity of ‖·‖, it follows that Ψnm(t) is a
non-empty measurable correspondence. Then the correspondence Ψn : T → 2E has a measurable
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graph. Since the set {hnm(t) : m ∈ N} is dense in B(t, pn), only the closest point fn(t) to f(t)
belongs to Ψn(t). Therefore Ψn is a measurable function which is equal to fn for µ−almost all
t ∈ T . Hence, fn is measurable for all n. It is now clear that fn ∈ S
1
X for all n.
We will show that
∫
T
fn(t)dµ →
∫
T
f(t)dµ in norm. Let ε > 0. Pick b ∈ B(t, p) ∩ Nε(f(t))
where Nε(f(t)) is a neighborhood of f(t) with the radius ε. Suppose b /∈ B(t, pn) for infinitely
many n. Then
pn · b > pn · e(t) + max pn · Y (t). (4.9)
For some ε ∈ (0, 1), we have
pn · εb > pn · e(t) + max pn · Y (t). (4.10)
As n→∞, it follows
p · εb ≥ p · e(t) + max p · Y (t) (4.11)
which contradicts b ∈ B(t, p).
Thus, there is a n¯ such that b ∈ B(t, pn) for all n ≥ n¯. Because of the minimizing prop-
erty (4.5) of fn(t) in B(t, pn), we have ‖fn(t) − f(t)‖ < ε. So limn→∞
∫
T
Ut(fn(t), pn)dµ =∫
T
Ut(f(t), p)dµ. And the Dominated Convergence Theorem
7 in [9] says
lim
n→∞
∫
T
‖fn(t)− f(t)‖ dµ = 0. (4.12)
Let xn =
∫
T
fn(t)dµ and αn =
∫
T
Ut(fn(t), pn)dµ. Then (xn, αn) ∈ A2(pn, yn) for all n ≥ n¯.
Moreover,
‖xn − x‖ =
∥∥∥∥
∫
T
fn(t)dµ −
∫
T
f(t)dµ
∥∥∥∥ ≤
∫
T
‖fn(t)− f(t)‖ dµ→ 0. (4.13)
The last inequality comes from Theorem 4 in [9] (p.46). Hence, xn → x in norm and αn → α.
It follows that A2 is norm lower semicontinuous.
We will show that A2 is convex valued. Pick (x, α) ∈ A2(p, y) and (x
′, α′) ∈ A2(p, y). Then
there is a function f : T → E such that
∫
T
f(t)dµ = x and
∫
T
Ut(f(t), p)dµ = α with f(t) ∈
B(t, p) a.e. t and a function f ′ : T → E such that
∫
T
f ′(t)dµ = x′ and
∫
T
Ut(f
′(t), p)dµ = α′
with f ′(t) ∈ B(t, p) a.e t. Let Z = E × R and we define a function h : T → Z by h(t) =
(f(t), Ut(f(t), p)) and a function h
′ : T → Z by h′(t) = (f ′(t), Ut(f
′(t), p)). It is clear that
h, h′ ∈ L1(µ,Z). Let ν be a measure defined by
ν(S) = (
∫
S
h(t)dµ,
∫
S
h′(t)dµ) (4.14)
for S ∈ T . Notice that ν(∅) = ((0, 0), (0, 0)) and ν(T ) = ((x, α), (x′, α′)). It follows from
Theorem 4.1 in [21] (Lyapunov’s convexity theorem) that the range of ν is convex. Thus there
7See Theorem 3 in [9] p. 45.
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exists S ∈ T such that ν(S) = λν(T ) = ((λx, λα), (λx′, λα′)) for λ ∈ (0, 1). Let fλ = fχS +
f ′χT\S. Then
∫
T
fλ(t)dµ =
∫
S
f(t)dµ +
∫
T\S f
′(t)dµ = λx + (1 − λ)x′ and
∫
S
Ut(f(t), p)dµ +∫
T\S Ut(f
′(t), p)dµ = λα+ (1 − λ)α′. It is clear that fλ(t) ∈ B(t, p). Therefore, A2 is a convex
valued correspondence.
Lemma 6. Γ has an equilibrium.
Proof. As we proved in the proof of Lemma 5, K1, K2 and K3 are non-empty, convex and
compact. Therefore, (i) of Lemma 1 is satisfied. Lemma 5 shows that Ai (i = 1, 2, 3) satisfies
(ii) of Lemma 1. It is easy to see that ui (i = 1, 2, 3) is continuous and quasi-concave on
Ki. Hence, (iii) of Lemma 1 holds. Now we can appeal to Lemma 1 to have an equilibrium
(p∗, (x∗, α∗), y∗) for Γ.
5 Proof of the Auxiliary Theorem
We are now ready to provide the proof of the Auxiliary Theorem.
Proof of the Auxiliary Theorem. We will prove that for an equilibrium for Γ, there is a
competitive equilibrium for the economy.
Suppose that (p∗, (x∗, α∗), y∗) is an equilibrium for Γ. Hence there exist f∗ ∈ S1X such that
that x∗ =
∫
T
f∗(t)dµ with f∗(t) ∈ B(t, p∗) and g∗ ∈ S1Y such that y
∗ =
∫
T
g∗(t)dµ. We will show
that (p∗, f∗, g∗) is a competitive equilibrium for the economy.
(i) We show that g∗ is a profit maximization production plan.
By the definition of u3, p
∗ · y∗ = p∗ ·
∫
T
g∗(t)dµ ≥ p∗ · y for any y ∈
∫
T
Y (t)dµ. Therefore,
p∗ ·
∫
T
g∗(t)dµ = max p∗ ·
∫
T
Y (t)dµ. By Proposition 6 in [16] (p.63), we have max p∗ ·
∫
T
Y (t)dµ =∫
T
max p∗ · Y (t)dµ. Thus p∗ · g∗(t) = max p∗ · Y (t) for almost all t ∈ T . Note that Proposition
6 in [16] works in our commodity space E.
(ii) Let us prove p∗ · f∗(t) ≤ p∗ · e(t) + p∗ · g∗(t) a.e. t ∈ T .
Note that f∗(t) ∈ B(t, p∗) = {x ∈ X(t) : p∗ · x ≤ p∗ · e(t) + max p∗ · Y (t)} for almost all
t ∈ T . From p∗ · g∗(t) = max p∗ · Y (t) for a.e. t ∈ T , we have the desired result.
(iii) We show that Ut(x, p
∗) > Ut(f
∗(t), p∗) implies p∗ · x > p∗ · e(t) + p∗ · g∗(t) for almost all
t ∈ T .
By way of contradiction, suppose there exists a non-empty subset S ∈ T which is of positive
measure and let F be a correspondence from S to X(t) defined by F (t) = {x ∈ X(t) : Ut(x, p
∗) >
Ut(f(t), p
∗) and p∗ · x ≤ p∗ · e(t) + p∗ · g∗(t)} for all t ∈ S. Recall that Ut(·, p
∗) is measurable
on the graph of X. Recall also that B(·, p∗) and X have measurable graphs. Therefore, F
has a measurable graph. Moreover, since X is integrably bounded, so is F . Hence, there is
a Bochner integrable selection f ′ of F . We now define f ′′ = f ′χS + f
∗χT\S . It is clear that
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∫
T
Ut(f
′′(t), p∗)dµ =
∫
S
Ut(f
′(t), p∗)dµ+
∫
T\S Ut(f
∗(t), p∗)dµ >
∫
T
Ut(f
∗(t), p∗)dµ = α∗ which is
a contradiction.
(iv) We prove that (f∗, g∗) is a feasible allocation and a production plan.
We know that p∗ · f∗(t) ≤ p∗ · e(t) + p∗ · g∗(t) a.e. t ∈ T . By aggregating over T , we have
p∗ · (
∫
T
f∗(t)dµ −
∫
T
e(t)dµ −
∫
T
g∗(t)dµ) ≤ 0. From the definition of the equilibrium of Γ, it
follows that for any p ∈ ∆,
p · (
∫
T
f∗(t)dµ−
∫
T
e(t)dµ−
∫
T
g∗(t))dµ ≤ p∗ · (
∫
T
f∗(t)dµ−
∫
T
e(t)dµ−
∫
T
g∗(t)dµ) ≤ 0. (5.1)
Therefore, −(
∫
T
f∗(t)dµ−
∫
T
e(t)dµ−
∫
T
g∗(t)dµ) ∈ E+ which leads to
∫
T
f∗(t)dµ ≤
∫
T
e(t)dµ+∫
T
g∗(t)dµ.
6 Proof of the Main Theorem
We provide the proof of the Main Theorem. The proof follows Noguchi [31] by considering a net
of truncated subeconomies, whose consumption and production sets are norm compact, which
is in line with Toussaint [38] and Khan and Yannleis [27]. From the Auxiliary Theorem, we
have a net of competitive equilibria for the subeconomies. We then construct a sequence of
competitive equilibria. Finally, by invoking the exact Fatou’s lemma for infinite dimensional
separable Banach spaces, we obtain a competitive equilibrium for the original economy.
Proof of the Main Theorem. As in Noguchi [31], we construct the norm compact subsets
of X(t) and Y (t). Let F = {K : T → 2E |K = co(KX ∪ KY ) where KX = co(∪mi=1ϕi),K
Y =
co(∪lj=1ψj) such that ϕi : T → E and ψj : T → E are measurable with ϕi(t) ∈ X(t) and ψj(t) ∈
Y (t) for all t ∈ T ; e(t), η(t) ∈ KX(t) and 0 ∈ KY (t) for all t ∈ T}.
Consider K = co(KX ∪ KY ) such that KX(t) = co(e(t) ∪ η(t)) for all t ∈ T and KY (t) =
0 for all t ∈ T . Then K ∈ F and thus F is non-empty. Let K1,K2 ∈ F . Then it is clear that
co(K1 ∪K2) ∈ F , which implies that F is directed under the inclusion. Notice that for every
t ∈ T , KX(t) = co(∪mi=1ϕi(t)) and K
Y (t) = co(∪lj=1ψj(t)) are norm compact and thus K(t) is
also norm compact (see Jameson [18] p.208). Now it follows that for K ∈ F , KX and KY are
non-empty, convex and norm compact valued, respectively. By Theorem III. 30 in [7], KX and
KY are graph measurable.
We define a truncated economy EK = [(T,T , µ), (KX (t),KY (t), UKt , e(t))t∈T ] where U
K
t is
the utility function Ut whose first domain is restricted to K
X(t). Since KX(t) is convex and
norm closed, by the separation theorem it is weakly closed. Thus it belongs to the Borel σ-
algebra generated by the weak topology of E. It is clear that UK is measurable.
It is easy to see that EK satisfies all the assumptions of the Auxiliary Theorem. Therefore,
we appeal to the Auxiliary Theorem to obtain a competitive equilibrium (pK , fK , gK) for E
K .
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Notice that {(pK , fK , gK) : K ∈ F} is a net directed by inclusion. For all K ∈ F , K
X(t) ⊂ X(t)
and, by A.1, X is integrably bounded and weakly compact valued. Thus {fK} is well-dominated.
We apply the same logic to KY and Y to see {gK} is also well-dominated.
Since X and Y are non-empty closed valued correspondences by A.1 and A.2, (T,T , µ) a
complete probability space, E a complete separable metric space, by Theorem III. 30 in [7] there
are two sequences of measurable functions ϕi : T → E and ψi : T → E such that
cl{ϕi(t)}i∈N = X(t) and cl{ψj(t)}j∈N = Y (t) for all t ∈ T. (6.1)
We then construct KXm (t) using {ϕi(t)}
m
i=1 and K
Y
l (t) using {ψj(t)}
l
j=1. Let us define n =
min {m, l} where m, l are the numbers of ϕi and of ψj in K, respectively. Then consider a
sequence of truncated subeconomies {En} consisting of KXn (t) and K
Y
n (t) for all t ∈ T . By the
Auxiliary Theorem, we now have a sequence of competitive equilibria (pn, fn, gn) for E
n.
We appeal to Lemma 4 to have f ∈ L1(µ,E) and g ∈ L1(µ,E) such that f(t) ∈ X(t), f(t) ∈
w-Ls {fn(t)} a.e t ∈ T and
∫
T
fdµ ∈ w-Ls {
∫
T
fndµ} as well as g(t) ∈ Y (t), g(t) ∈ w-Ls {gn(t)}
a.e. t ∈ T and
∫
T
gdµ ∈ w-Ls {
∫
T
gndµ}. Therefore, f is an allocation and g is a production
plan. Since pn belongs to ∆ which is weak* compact, it has a subsequence still denoted by pn
weak* converging to p.
We will now show that (p, f, g) is a competitive equilibrium for E .
Step 1: Let us show that for x ∈ X(t),
Ut(x, p) > Ut(f(t), p) implies p · x > p · e(t) + max p · Y (t) for almost all t ∈ T. (6.2)
We follow Khan and Sagara [24] for this proof. By method of contradiction, suppose that
there exists S ∈ T of positive measure with the following property: for every t ∈ S there
exists xˆ ∈ X(t) such that Ut(xˆ, p) > Ut(f(t), p) and p · xˆ ≤ p · e(t) + max p · Y (t). Since
p · e(t) + max p · Y (t) > 0 by A.3 and A.8, it follows from the joint continuity of Ut that
Ut(εxˆ, p) > Ut(f(t), p) and p · εxˆ < p · e(t) + max p · Y (t) for some ε ∈ (0, 1). Thus, we
can assume without loss of generality that for every t ∈ S there exists xˆ ∈ X(t) such that
Ut(xˆ, p) > Ut(f(t), p) and p · xˆ < p · e(t) + max p · Y (t). Let us define the correspondence
Λ : S → 2E by
Λ(t) = {x ∈ X(t)|Ut(x, p) > Ut(f(t), p), p · x < p · e(t) + max p · Y (t)}.
Λ is an integrably bounded correspondence and xˆ ∈ Λ(t). We now show that Λ is graph
measurable. Let Λ1(t) := {x ∈ X(t)|Ut(x, p) > Ut(f(t), p)} and Λ2(t) := {x ∈ E|p · x <
p · e(t) +max p · Y (t)}. Then Λ(t) = Λ1(t)∩Λ2(t). We need to prove that Λ1 and Λ2 are graph
measurable. In the proof of Lemma 5, we already showed the joint measurability of the function
given by (t, x)→ p · x− p · e(t)−max p · Y (t). Therefore, Λ2 is graph measurable.
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We turn to Λ1. Let ζ : T × E → T × E × E be a mapping defined by ζ(t, x) = (t, x, f(t))
and projT×E×E be a projection of (T × E) × (T × E × E) onto the range space T × E × E of
ζ. By the projection theorem,8 projT×E×E(Gζ) belongs to T ⊗B(E,w)⊗B(E,w). We define a
set H by
H := {(t, x, x′) ∈ T × E × E|Ut(x, p) > Ut(x
′, p)} ∩ ((GX)× E) ∩ projT×E×E(Gζ).
Then in view of A.5 and A.6, H belongs to T ⊗B(E,w)⊗B(E,w). Let projT×E be the projection
of (T ×E)×E onto T ×E. Since GΛ1 = projT×E(H), we again appeal to the projection theorem
to argue that GΛ1 belongs to T ⊗ B(E,w).
Therefore, Λ has a measurable selection by Aumann’s measurable selection theorem in [4].
Let h : S → E be a measurable selection from Λ. By Theorem III. 30 in [7], we can choose a
sequence of measurable selections hn : S → E such that hn(t) ∈ X(t) converges to h(t) in norm
for all t ∈ S. By Lemma 4, there exists a Bochner integrable function hˆ : S → E such that
hˆ(t) ∈ w-Ls{hn(t)} and hˆ(t) ∈ X(t) a.e. t ∈ S. Hence, there is a subsequence of {hn(t)} in E
converging weakly to hˆ(t) for a.e. t ∈ S. It is clear that hˆ(t) = h(t) a.e. t ∈ S and we also have
(f(t), h(t)) ∈ w-Ls{(fn(t), hn(t))} a.e. t ∈ S.
Suppose now that the following set defined by
⋃
n∈N
{t ∈ S|Unt (hn(t), pn) > U
n
t (fn(t), pn), pn · hn(t) < pn · e(t) + max pn ·K
Y
n (t)}
is of measure zero. Then for each n, Unt (fn(t), pn) ≥ U
n
t (hn(t), pn) or pn · hn(t) ≥ pn · e(t) +
max pn ·K
Y
n (t) a.e. t ∈ S. Notice for any y ∈ Y (t), there is a sequence of measurable functions
yn : T → E such that yn(t) ∈ K
Y
n (t) converges to y in norm for all t ∈ T by Theorem III. 30 in [7].
When pn converges to p in the weak* topology, we have pn ·hn(t)→ p ·h(t) and pn ·yn(t)→ p ·y.
Passing to the limit yields Ut(f(t), p) ≥ Ut(h(t), p) or p ·h(t) ≥ p · e(t)+max p ·Y (t) a.e. t ∈ S.
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But this is a contradiction to the fact that h is a measurable selection from Λ. Hence, there
exists n such that {t ∈ S|Unt (hn(t), pn) > U
n
t (fn(t), p), pn · hn(t) < pn · e(t) + max pn ·K
Y
n (t)}
is of positive measure. However, this contradicts the fact that pn and fn are a price and an
allocation of a Walrasian equilibrium for En. We proved (6.2).
Indeed, we can further show that
p · f(t) ≥ p · e(t) + max p · Y (t) (6.3)
for almost all t ∈ T .
By A.4 (ii), if f(t) is a satiation point, (6.3) follows. If f(t) is not a satiation point, f(t)
belongs to the weak closure of the upper contour set {x′ ∈ X(t) : Ut(x
′, p) > Ut(f(t), p)} for any
8see Theorem III.23 in [7].
9Note that for x ∈ KXn (t), U
n
t (x, p) = Ut(x, p) for any p ∈ ∆.
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p ∈ ∆. Thus, (6.2) implies (6.3).
Step 2: We show that f is a feasible allocation and g is a feasible production plan.
Since (pn, fn, gn) is a competitive equilibrium for E
n, it is clear that
∫
T
fn(t)dµ ≤
∫
T
e(t)dµ+∫
T
gn(t)dµ. Recall that for {fn} and {gn} Lemma 4 holds. Thus we can extract subsequences
(which we do not relabel) from {fn} and {gn} such that
∫
T
fn(t)dµ →
∫
T
f(t)dµ weakly and∫
T
gn(t)dµ→
∫
T
g(t)dµ weakly. Now from
∫
T
fn(t)dµ ≤
∫
T
e(t)dµ +
∫
T
gn(t)dµ we obtain
∫
T
f(t)dµ ≤
∫
T
e(t)dµ +
∫
T
g(t)dµ. (6.4)
Step 3: We prove that p · f(t) ≤ p · e(t) + p · g(t) for almost all t ∈ T .
From (6.3), we have
p · f(t) ≥ p · e(t) + p · g(t) (6.5)
for almost all t ∈ T . By integrating (6.5) over T ,
∫
T
[p · f(t)− p · e(t)− p · g(t)]dµ = p ·
∫
T
[f(t)− e(t)− g(t)]dµ ≥ 0. (6.6)
But from (6.4) it follows that
p ·
∫
T
[f(t)− e(t)− g(t)]dµ =
∫
T
[p · f(t)− p · e(t)− p · g(t)] ≤ 0. (6.7)
Hence, we can conclude
∫
T
[p · f(t)− p · e(t)− p · g(t)] = 0. Therefore, we have
p · f(t) = p · e(t) + p · g(t) (6.8)
for almost all t ∈ T .
Step 4: Let us prove p · g(t) = max p · Y (t) a.e. t ∈ T .
From (6.3) and (6.8), we have the following inequality:
max p · Y (t) ≤ p · f(t)− p · e(t) = p · g(t) (6.9)
for almost all t ∈ T . Obviously, we have max p·Y (t) ≥ p·g(t). Hence, the conclusion follows.
7 Concluding Remarks
Remark 1 We can appeal to Galerkin approximations, as suggested by Khan and Sagara [24],
to construct a sequence of truncated subeconomies {En} with finite dimensional commodity
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spaces. Each En can have a competitive equilibrium (pn, fn, gn) due to Greenberg et al. [12].
We then apply the exact Fatou’s lemma to the sequence of {fn, gn} to obtain f and g. By
the weak* compactness of ∆, we can extract a subsequence from {pn} that weak* converges
to p ∈ ∆. Applying similar arguments as in Khan and Sagara [24], we can show that (p, f, g)
satisfies the properties of a competitive equilibrium.10
Remark 2 The Auxiliary theorem can be seen as a direct proof of Greenberg et al. [12] for
infinite dimensional commodity spaces without taking the approximation approach.
Remark 3 We can replace the weak compactness of production sets by the following condition:
Let AY be a set defined by AY = {g
′ ∈ S1Y : ∃f
′ ∈ S1X s.t.
∫
T
f ′(t)dµ ≤
∫
T
e(t)dµ+
∫
T
g′(t)dµ}.
We assume AY is weakly compact.
Applying our approach in the proof of the main theorem, we construct a sequence of truncated
subeconomies {En} and obtain a sequence of competitive equilibria {pn, fn, gn}.
11 Since X(t) is
integrably bounded and weakly compact, we apply the exact Fatou’s lemma to {fn} to have f
and since AY is weakly compact, we have gn → g in the weak topology. Also pn → p ∈ ∆ in the
weak* topology. We are then able to prove that (p, f, g) is a competitive equilibrium.
For the sequence {fn}, we need two results: (by passing to a subsequence) fn → f and
fn(t)→ f(t) for almost all t ∈ T . These results make f a feasible allocation and f(t) a maximal
element for the agent t. To our best knowledge, there are two ways to obtain these results:
invoking the exact Fatou’s Lemma or appealing to Theorem 5.1 in Khan and Yannelis [27].
Both approaches require weak compact subsets of the consumption sets. Therefore, even when
we relax the weak compactness assumption of the consumption sets, we still need some weak
compact subsets of the consumption sets which contain the set of maximal elements.
10We are grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to Khan and Sagara [24].
11Remark 3 in [12] provided an equilibrium existence result with non-compact consumption and production
sets for their economy.
17
References
[1] Aliprantis, C. and K. Border (2006), Infinite Dimensional Analysis, 3rd edition, New York,
Springer-Verlag.
[2] Aubin, J.-P. and H. Frankowska (1990), Set-Valued Analysis, Boston, Birkha¨user.
[3] Aumann, R.J. (1966), “Existence of competitive equilibria in markets with a continuum of
traders,” Econometrica 34, pp. 1-17.
[4] Aumann, R.J. (1969), “Measurable utility and the measurable choice theorem,” in: La
De´cision, CNRS, Aix-en-Provence, pp. 15-26.
[5] Balasko, Y. (2003), “Economies with price-dependent preferences,” Journal of Economic
Theory 109, pp. 333359
[6] Balasko, Y. (2003), “Temporary financial equilibrium,” Economic Theory 21, pp. 118.
[7] Castaing, C. and M. Valadier (1977), Convex Analysis and Measurable Multifunctions, Lec-
ture Notes in Math. 580, Springer, Berlin.
[8] Debreu, G. (1952), “A social equilibrium existence theorem,” Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 38, pp. 886-893.
[9] Diestel, J. and J.J. Uhl (1977), Vector Measures, Mathematical Surveys No. 15. Providence,
American Mathematical Society.
[10] Fajardo, S. and H.J. Keisler (2002), Model Theory of Stochastic Processes, A K Peters,
Ltd., Natick.
[11] Fremlin, D. H. (2012), Measure Theory, Vol. 3: Measure Algebras, Part I, second ed., Torres
Fremlin, Colchester.
[12] Greenberg, J., B. Shitovitz and A. Wieczorek (1979), “Existence of equilibria in atom-
less production economies with price dependent preferences,” Journal of Mathematical Eco-
nomics 6, pp. 31-41.
[13] Greinecker, M and K. Podczeck (2013), “Liapounoffs vector measure theorem in Banach
spaces and applications to general equilibrium theory,” Economic Theory Bulletin 1, pp.
157-173.
[14] Greinecker, M and K. Podczeck (2017), “An Exact Fatou’s Lemma for Gelfand Integrals
by Means of Young Measure Theory,” Journal of Convex Analysis 24, pp. 621-644.
[15] Hildenbrand, W. (1970), “Existence of equilibria for economies with production and a
measure space of consumers,” Econometrica 38, pp. 608-623.
18
[16] Hildenbrand, W. (1974), Core and Equilibria of a large economy, Princeton University
Press, Princeton.
[17] Hoover, D.N. and H.J. Keisler (1984), “Adapted probability distributions,” Transactions
of the American Mathematical Society 286, pp. 159-201.
[18] Jameson, G. (1974), Topology and Normed Spaces, Chapman and Hall, London.
[19] Kakutani, S. (1944), “Construction of a Non-separable Extension of the Lebesgue Measure
Space,” Proceedings of the Imperial Academy 20 (3), pp. 115-119.
[20] Keisler, H.J. and Y. Sun (2009), “Why saturated probability spaces are necessary,” Ad-
vances in Mathematics 221, pp. 15841607.
[21] Khan, M.A. and N. Sagara (2013), “Maharam-types and Lyapunov’s theorem for vector
measures on Banach spaces,” Illinois Journal of Mathematics 57, pp. 145-169.
[22] Khan, M.A. and N. Sagara (2014), “Weak sequential convergence in L1(µ,X) and an exact
version of Fatou’s lemma,” Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications 412, pp.
554-563.
[23] Khan, M.A. and N. Sagara (2016), “Relaxed large economies with infinite-dimensional com-
modity spaces: The existence of Walrasian equilibria,” Journal of Mathematical Economics
67, pp. 95-107.
[24] Khan, M.A. and N. Sagara (2017), “Fatou’s lemma, Galerkin approximations and the exis-
tence of Walrasian equilibria in infinite dimensions,” Pure and Applied Functional Analysis
2 (2), pp. 317-355.
[25] Khan, M.A., N. Sagara and T. Suzuki (2016), “An exact Fatou lemma for Gelfand integrals:
a characterization of the Fatou property,”Positivity 20, pp. 343354.
[26] Khan, M.A. and T. Suzuki (2016), “On differentiated and indivisible commodities: An
expository re-framing of Mas-Colell’s 1975 model,” Advances in Mathematical Economics
20, pp. 103-128.
[27] Khan, M.A. and N.C. Yannelis (1991), “Equilibria in markets with a continuum of agents
and commodities,” in: Khan, M.A. and N.C. Yannelis, eds., Equilibrium Theory in Infinite
Dimensional Spaces, New York, Springer-Verlag, pp. 233-248.
[28] Lee, S. (2013), “Competitive equilibrium with an atomless measure space of agents and in-
finite dimensional commodity space without convex and complete preferences,” Hitotsubashi
Journal of Economics 54, pp. 221-230.
19
[29] Liu, J. (2017), “Existence of competitive equilibrium in coalition production economies with
a continuum of agents,” International Journal of Game Theory 46, pp. 941-955.
[30] Maharam, D., (1942), “On homogeneous measure algebra,” Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the USA, 28, pp. 108-111.
[31] Noguchi, M. (1997), “Economies with a continuum of consumers, a continuum of suppliers
and an infinite dimensional commodity space,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 27, pp.
121.
[32] Podczeck, K. (1997), “Markets with infinitely many commodities and a continuum of agents
with non-convex preferences,” Economic Theory 9, pp. 385-426.
[33] Podczeck, K. (2008), “On the convexity and compactness of the integral of a Banach space
valued correspondence,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 44, pp. 836-852.
[34] Schaefer, H. H. and M. P. Wolff, (1999), Topological Vector Spaces, 2nd edn., Springer,
Berlin.
[35] Schmeidler, D. (1969), “Competitive equilibria in markets with a continuum of traders and
incomplete preferences,” Econometrica 37, pp. 578-585.
[36] Shafer, W. J. (1974), “The Nontransitive Consumer,” Econometrica 42, pp. 913-919.
[37] Sun, Y. and N.C. Yannelis (2008), “Saturation and the integration of Banach valued cor-
respondences,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 44, pp. 861-865.
[38] Toussaint, S. (1984), “On the Existence of Equilibria in Economies with Infinitely Many
Commodities and Ordered Preferences,” Journal of Economic Theory 33, pp. 98-115.
[39] Yannelis, N.C. (1991), “Set-valued functions of two variables,” in: Khan, M.A. and N.C.
Yannelis, eds., Equilibrium Theory in Infinite Dimensional Spaces, New York, Springer-
Verlag, pp. 36-72.
20
